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Beppe Grillo’s success is not a rejection of austerity, but a
protest against the corruption and inefficiency of the Italian
political system.
by Blog Admin
The success of Beppe Grillo’s ‘5 Stars Movement’ in Italy’s elections on the 24-25 February
has been regarded by some commentators as a rejection of austerity by the Italian electorate.
Marco Simoni argues that rather than rejecting austerity, Italian voters were primarily
protesting against decades of economic stagnation, and a political system which is prone to
corruption and clientelism. He concludes that unless mainstream politics can reorganise
around a credible reform agenda, populist movements will continue to play a key role in the
country.
On the 24th of  February, Paul Krugman suggested in the New York Times that the surge of  the populist “5
Stars Movement” in Italy, and ensuing polit ical instability, was to be blamed on German-led austerity
measures.
I am – generally speaking – all in f avour of  a less dogmatic approach to budget balancing in Europe and,
more importantly, to the beginning of  a genuine EU-wide f iscal policy capable of  correcting market
imbalances. That is, in Krugman-speak, my sympathies are more ‘salt-water ’ than ‘f resh-water ’. However,
with regard to Italy, Krugman’s diagnosis does not seem to hold any water. Italians were not holding a
ref erendum on austerity, they were instead voting on the decline of  their economy and the inef f ectiveness
of  their – expensive – polit ical classes more broadly.
In the f igures below I plot public expenditure growth and real GDP per capita growth. While Italy’s
expenditure has increased above the Eurozone average since 1995, its rate of  economic growth has been
f ar below average. Indeed, it has basically been negligible f or over a decade.
Figure 1: Current expenditure as a percentage of GDP (1995=100)
Source: Ameco database
Figure 2: Real GDP per capita (1995=100)
Source: Ameco database
In f act, as Krugman himself  underscored in a previous article, the problem with Italy lies in nearly two
decades of  stagnant growth despite rising expenditure. For those interested, I address the causes behind
the decline in this paper. To brief ly summarise: erratic economic ref orms have f ailed to provide the economy
with the right set of  incentives, leading to a stalling of  innovation and a decline in productivity.
The polit ical consequences of  such a decline were not obvious until the recent elections, when the most
unusual electoral law in Western Europe lef t the country with a hung parliament as a result of  f ragmented
electoral results. Two decades of  economic stagnation and incoherent policies have created a very strong
insider / outsider dynamic. In Italy, this dynamic cuts across f amily income and education levels, because
rents, market regulations, and dif f used monopolies render meritocracy a distant dream. Italians voted f or a
“party alternative” because of  this dynamic, not because of  the cost of  the more recent austerity
measures.
In f act, many de-f acto rents and monopolies are strongly intertwined with polit ical agency. During the last
twenty years, Italian polit ical parties – at the local and national level – have continued to have strong
discretion in the management of  public resources, including sizeable direct and indirect f inancing to party
polit ics. To name a f ew examples amidst many: public health managers, the board to the large public
broadcasting company, and the CEOs and board of  directors of  local utility companies (all of  which are
owned by local governments) are de-f acto party-polit ics appointees. This system is unsurprisingly prone to
corruption and clientelism, but most importantly is spectacularly inef f icient.
What the latest round of  elections in Italy represents is theref ore a gigantic output- legit imacy crisis (a
condition whereby a system loses legit imacy because it proves unable to deliver satisf actory outcomes) of
a very expensive system in which the process of  polit ical elite f ormation (the input- legit imacy) is also
questioned by a growing share of  the population. This translated into extremely f ragmented electoral
results.
In 2008, 85 per cent of  votes went to one of  the two main coalit ions; today that f igure is down to less than
60 per cent. The third polit ical f orce is now the “5 Stars Movement” (M5S) led by the f ormer comedian
Beppe Grillo, which gained 25 per cent of  the national vote on the platf orm of  “wiping away” the incumbent
party elites. The M5S is a peculiar polit ical party: their leader did not run in the election. Additionally, M5S
candidates f or the Parliament (as well as their leader) ref used to debate their ideas outside their own
Internet f orum: no M5S candidate was ever broadcasted in TV or Radio within Italy, nor interviewed by the
Italian press, which is blamed by the M5S f or being part of  the system.
Further, the new civic movement led by incumbent Prime Minster Mario Monti won roughly 10 per cent of  the
vote. Some considered this an unsatisf actory result given the well- regarded reputation of  Mr Monti.
However, this result is considerable if  assessed against the f act that Mr Monti was called in as a non-
partisan PM to restore international credibility in the middle of  f inancial turmoil. The decision to run in
elections af ter having implemented tough economic measures, with the aim to consolidate ref orms and
move towards measures to stimulate growth, remains unprecedented f rom an international standpoint. At
any rate, the f uture role of  the “Scelta Civica” movement will depend on its ability to def ine a sharp
ref ormist polit ical prof ile.
The two main parties, the Democratic Party (PD) and the Party of  Freedom (PDL) are still very important,
but are now obviously tainted by internal polit ical controversy. The f ormer “won” the elections with less
than 0.5 per cent more than the right, while shedding 3.5 million votes (or 7 per cent), compared to the 2008
elections (which they lost). The latter lost half  of  its votes compared to 2008, yet still heads the second
largest coalit ion. Finally, it is worth noting the resilience of  the Northern league (Lega Nord), a localist and
Eurosceptic movement. Lega Nord is a long-time ally of  Berlusconi, but with a remarkable polit ical autonomy.
Despite the f act that the party also lost vote share, it now governs the three wealthiest regions of  the
country.
This f ragmentation ref lects deep rif ts in Italian society, the lack of  legit imacy of  tradit ional polit ical
leadership and its inability to attract new voters, and the widespread discontent against dismal economic
perf ormance. Unless polit ical leadership is reorganised around a credible ref ormist agenda, populism is
likely to continue to increase in importance.
Disclaimer: Marco Simoni serves in the “Scelta Civica” movement led by Mario Monti.
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